

Parcel Assembly

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Toronto in 1903



Toronto Right Now



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Model

Key components of the model

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 - No mechanism for developers to signal productivity in a preceding stage; a key insight of Strange (1995)
 - Developers must assemble all parcels in x (Indivisibility)
- Each landowner offers price $p(i, x)$ to maximize

$$\max_{p(i, x)} \underbrace{[1 - F[\nu^*(x)]] p(i, x)}_{\text{Sale successful}} + \underbrace{F[\nu^*(x)] r(x) \bar{h}(x)}_{\text{Returns if sale failed}} \quad (1)$$

where F is the distribution of developer productivity, ν^* is the cutoff productivity

- If sale successful, developer of productivity ν earns

$$\pi(x, \nu) = \nu \kappa(x) r(x)^{1+\epsilon} \quad (2)$$

and pays a price $\mathbf{p}(x) = \sum_i N(i, x) p(i, x)$ to assemble all parcels. Therefore, cutoff productivity ν^* solves

$$\mathbf{p}(x) = \pi(x, \nu^*) = \nu^* \kappa(x) r(x)^{1+\epsilon}$$

- Developers accept all offers when $\nu \geq \nu^*(x)$

Solution to game for a special distribution

- If $\nu \sim \text{Weibull}$ with CDF $F(\nu) = 1 - e^{-\sigma\lambda\nu^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}$ then offered prices and cutoff productivity take a special form for empirical analysis

$$\mathbf{p}(x) = r(x)\bar{h}(x) + \kappa(x)r(x)^{1+\epsilon}\lambda^{-1}\nu^*(x)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}N(x) \quad (3)$$

$$\nu^*(x) = r(x)^{-\epsilon}\kappa(x)^{-1}\bar{h}(x) + \lambda^{-1}\tilde{N}(x)\nu^*(x)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \quad (4)$$

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- A special case when $\bar{h} = 0$ (land is undeveloped) gets

$$\nu^*(x) = \lambda^{-\sigma}N(x)^{\sigma} \quad (5)$$

$$\mathbf{p}(x) = \lambda^{-\sigma}N(x)^{\sigma}\kappa(x)r(x)^{1+\epsilon} \quad (6)$$

$\implies \sigma$ is the elast. of $N(x)$ to prices $\mathbf{p}(x)$, productivity $\nu^*(x)$ and **semi-elast. of development probability!**

Model conclusions

- Model elucidates two key empirical ideas:
 1. Rents $r(x)$ and construction productivity $\kappa(x)$ are confounders to estimate σ
 2. Heterogeneous treatments effects: hold up more severe when rents are higher/construction costs are lower
- Idea: use hyperlocal variation in parcel density, eliminating these cofounders (across streets)
- Get an estimate of σ from this regression using historical and modern parcel maps; allows us to directly answer research question

Data

- Historical Toronto fire insurance maps (1818, 1858, 1880, 1889, 1903, 1913, 1924)
- Historical aerial imagery (1939, 1947, 1954, 1965, 1978)
- Rental rates by census tract (1961, 1971, 1981, 1991)
- Modern parcels, building footprints, and land use

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
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- This is a work in progress

Toronto in 1923



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Thank you!